After a discussion of the impact of the principle of equality, entrenched in the Charters approved in Canada since the 1867 British North American Act, this essay then focuses on the related Supreme Court's adjudications. A brief analysis of the case-law concerning gender equality is followed by the discussion of cases of Aboriginal and Muslim women with the aim of assessing whether intersectionality represents for these groups of women a source of double discrimination. Brief concluding remarks discuss the challenges deriving from the different options for accommodating the principle of equality with cultural rights.
Introduction: framing intersectionality in the Canadian context
In the Fall of 2017 the eyes of the world turned on Canada for two, seemingly unrelated, instances: the first was the occasion of the New York 'He for She' meeting (20 September 2017) , where Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau spoke passionately in favour of gender equality, declaring his willingness to raise feminist sons. Then, on 18
October 2017, Quebec approved Bill 62, 'An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies' actually prohibiting face-covering in public places, with a (not-so-implicit) reference to the Islamic veil. These events suddenly interrelate when we underline that they both deal with historical discrimination against women, and that both of them apparently wanted to support women's emancipation. Nevertheless, behind this theoretical support, one should ask what kind of feminism had Trudeau in mind when he advertised his willingness to raise his sons as feminists as well as whether prohibiting the veil is a real tool for achieving women's emancipation.
Answering these questions is impossible without first recognizing that for a long time feminism has been a white, middle-class, heterosexual, Christian-formed, and able-bodied prerogative unable to tackle the fact that 'gender does not exist in isolation but intersects with other identities like race or class, as well as embedded in practices and representations which, basically, refer to the organizing system of power relation in society' (Bonifacio 2012: 3) .
In reality, the idea of gender intersectionality has only slowly developed among scholars since Crenshaw's seminal article demonstrated how Black women have been discriminated against by US Courts, failing to understand that specific issues concern this group of women because of both race and gender, and that specific remedies should therefore be implemented (Crenshaw 1989) . The words of the district court in De Graffernreid v. General Motors 1976 epitomised such incomprehension: 'the plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have been discriminated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new "super-remedy" . . . Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both'. 
The principle of gender equality in Canada
Due to its origins as a British colony, from the establishment of the Confederation with the British North American Act -BNA (1867) to the 1931 recognition of self-governance inside the British Commonwealth, Canada has followed British legislation, according to which the status of women was also governed. Indeed, as far as the recognition of political and civil rights went, and in line with British legislation, women could theoretically (there is a lack of evidence of their actual participation) be included among 'persons' allowed to vote. However, according to the provisions of the 1791 Constitutional Act, this was subject to their demonstrating that they owned a property of a certain value; a status achievable only by widows and single women, but not by married women, as the law provided an automatic transfer of the ownership to the husband at the moment of the wedding.
Similarly, since 1809 Quebecois women owning properties were entitled to vote. The language of the 1840 Act of Union was neutral as well, and since its entry into force women probably started to be more politically active -and therefore object to men's request for a clarification of the legislation in their exclusive favour -as demonstrated by a complaint raised by a defeated Reform candidate who protested that seven women voted for his Tory opponent in Canada West (formerly Upper Canada) in 1844. Indeed, at the provincial level electoral laws were progressively amended in order to clearly exclude women from those eligible to vote.
This decision was completely contrary to the tradition of the majority of Aboriginal communities, which based participation in decision-making according to rules indifferent to gender, and more akin to the 'relevance' of each individual inside the community.
Nevertheless, the approach of excluding women from the public sphere was completely consistent with the tradition of that time in the colonial power. Therefore, the BNA, although ruling that voters' eligibility was a provincial matter, denied women the right to vote by establishing it only for British (or naturalized) males over 21 years old.
World War I partially changed societal behaviour, and women's participation in the military effort was rewarded with a recognition of the right to vote in some Provinces, the and also women serving in the military, were allowed to vote. On 25 May 1918, the Westminster Parliament gave women the right to vote in a Dominion election, provided they were British subjects having attained legal capacity (21 years) and otherwise met the same qualifications entitling a man to vote. Therefore, in 1920 the Dominion Elections Act was amended to recognise all Canadians, male or female, over 21 as eligible voters in federal elections. Slowly, all Provinces adapted their legislation to the new federal law, the last being Quebec on 25 April 1940 (Cleverdon 1974). As described in detail below, this evolution was not accepted without resistance, and in 1929 a specific decision of the Privy Council was needed to recognise women's voting eligibility.
In spite of this recognition of gender equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote, women belonging to minorities continued to be considered as minors for a long time: 
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Despite the recognition of rights and the enactment of laws (almost) equalising women to men in the field of private law, at the time of the royal assent for the entry into force of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) , sex still was not fully conceived of as an element of possible discrimination. Indeed, although sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights recognized that rights should be protected 'without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex', the then Minister of Justice Davie Fulton clearly stated in front of the ad hoc committee established for studying the Bill, that a distinction existed between the equality before the law on the basis of sex and the difference in status between men and women. Notably, he anticipated that sec. 1 'would not be interpreted by the courts so as to say we are making men and women equal, because men and women are not equal: they are 
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Since the Supreme Court started its role of court of last resort, and despite the legislative recognition of equality, its adjudication has, for a long time, prejudiced women due to the test used for assessing the existence of a gender-based discrimination. Indeed, the Court relied on the idea that consistency of treatment would be enough to ensure equality, assuming that whenever women and men are treated the same procedurally, they would enjoy the same opportunities; furthermore, the Court assessed discrimination only unemployed pregnant women differently from other unemployed persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are pregnant and not because they are women'; evidently the distinguished judges, and the whole Court, forgot that pregnancy is a condition that affects only women.
After the entry into force of the 1982 Canadian Charter, the Court seemed to adopt a more protective approach for women's rights, probably relying on jurisprudence more akin to the general protection of human rights that it was developing during that period. separation -despite the fact that the wife used to take care of it on her own for five months of the year -arguing that the wife was simply performing activities typical of any ranch wife, and which were not sufficient to create a beneficial interest in the property.
Patriarchal echoes still continued to be evident twenty years later in the Thibaudeau decision. XXV Here the Court refused to declare a violation of the principle of gender equality in the provision of the Income Tax Act, forcing a mother to pay income tax on her child support payment, despite the fact that her ex-spouse could have deducted payments from his taxable income.
XXVI
In a final comment on Supreme Court's jurisprudence on gender equality, it should be also noted that in several cases a claim for gender equality was raised by men. Here, the position of the Court seemed to support men's claims, notwithstanding the possible consequences on women. A neutral approach, for instance, was used in the case of a man challenging the legislation protecting birth mothers from forcefully acknowledging biological fathers on birth certificate and including their surnames in the child's surname. 
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The Court decided that this protection, although aimed at ensuring women's selfdetermination, discriminated against men in so far as it denied their aspirations to affirm biological ties and familial bonds across generations.
XXVII Quite controversially, a genderblind approach was used in adjudicating the claims on gender equality of men accused of sexual assaults XXVIII (Baines 2012: 95).
Women belonging to minorities: the cases of Aboriginal and Muslim women
At the time of colonization, the rights and status of Aboriginal peoples was at first Almost coevally to the Charter, in 1988 Canada also approved the Multiculturalism Act, which definitively affirmed multiculturalism as a foundational principle of the State, in accordance with an approach followed under the Premiership of Pierre Trudeau of the 1970s. In the same period, the Supreme Court intervened in its interpretation of multiculturalism, with reference to religious pluralism as a hindrance to the establishment of favourable treatments only for some religions.
XXXI These interventions impinged on the evolution of the Canadian system, as they involved a new approach toward minorities, aimed at respecting their collective rights as a form of protection for the cultural heritage they represent for the country.
Despite this framework establishing equality among religions and among believers, the intersectionality between gender equality and religious freedom raised critical challenges for Canada, and the way they were faced still gives rise to potential critique. Although the NWAC failed to demonstrate that the convened groups were unable to represent women's points of view.
Aboriginal women also failed to obtain recognition of their gender equality in decisions concerning the acquisition of properties, a topic on which the discriminative approach of the Court with broad reference to Canadian women has been already discussed. Notably, in 
Muslim women
As said, religious communities in Canada benefit from a legal framework based on multiculturalism, which accords them great margins of discretion in ruling some aspects of their lives according to religious precepts. In the recognition of a role for these precepts, however, lies the risk of endangering the implementation of gender equality and therefore specific attention must be paid to adjudications balancing the protection of religious freedoms with the protection of gender rights.
Although the risks deriving from intersectionality between gender and religion concern women belonging to all religious communities, XLV it was decided here to pay specific attention to the cases of Muslim Canadian women, as the risks for their gender equality are twofold. On the one side, they may be endangered by a strict interpretation of the religious precepts of Islam, which could confine them to an unescapable position of subjugation. While we are still waiting to see the role the judiciary will eventually play in the implementation of Bill 62, it is worth to remembering that, at this stage, the issue of the veil was only discussed for the first time before the Supreme Court in 2012, XLVII when, in a rape trial in Ontario 'N.S.' claimed her right to take the witness stand wearing the veil.
'N.S'. was a woman accusing her aunt and her cousin of rape, who refused to remove her veil at the request of the defendants, who claimed that this garment would have concealed her facial expression, thus jeopardizing their right to full answer and defence. After a colloquium with her, the prosecutor forced 'N.S.' to remove the veil, taking the fact that she already removed it for her driving license photo as proof of her moderate adherence to the religious precept. As a consequence, 'N.S.' appealed to the Superior Court of Justice and then to the Court of Appeal of Ontario, which both refused to take a decision and affirmed the need of a case-by-case decision to be taken by the prosecutor, although inviting the latter to deeply evaluate women's religious behaviour. Consequently, 'N.S.' appealed to the Supreme Court for a final decision. However, the Court confirmed that this kind of decision cannot be taken according to a general rule and has to be assessed on a case-by-case evaluation pertaining to the prosecutor. E -212 of sec. 6.5 of the manual for taking the oath, which since 2011 provided a duty for the citizenship candidates wearing face coverings to remove them during the ceremony in order to avoid the termination of their application for citizenship, on the grounds that the removal of the veil was not justified by reasons of security or of identity certification.
Despite the government's argument that removal was not mandatory, as the manual only offered guidelines, the Federal Court invalidated section 6.5 on the assumption of its mandatory nature, and affirming that it interfered 'with a citizenship judge's duty to allow candidates for citizenship the greatest possible freedom in the religious solemnization or the solemn affirmation of the oath'. 
Concluding remarks
Cultural traditions imbued with patriarchal traits represent the main hindrance to a full implementation of the principle of gender equality, even when this is a clearly stated aim in fundamental Charters, as has occurred in the case of Canada. Furthermore, this principle is notably endangered when it has to be balanced with the need to accommodate ethnic and religious minorities, whose understanding of it may vary greatly from ideas affirmed in liberal democracies. In Canada, this meant a rising tension between two prominent principles of the legal system: equality and multiculturalism. In fact, the way conflicting equalities should be reconciled has represented a highly debated point among scholars (Deveaux 2000: 523-525) . Some have argued that liberal democracies should accord protection to cultural rights providing that compliance with them does not infringe the respect of individual autonomy and of equality (Okin 1997 -Kymlika 1997 ; others have maintained that discrimination deriving from cultural traditions should be respected (Carens 1990 ) and ultimately only modified through dialogue and confrontation among groups and communities (Parekh 1996) . Both these points of view, however, may be accused of approaching the topic from a very selfish and 'western' perspective, according to which there is a specific perception of equality to be protected, despite the fact that they propose two different paths to provide such protection. At the same time, it could be hard to abandon the perception of equality which might recognise a community's option of carrying out discrimination in name of its specific culture, or even justify crimes with the so-called cultural defence, L given the fact that equality is a quintessential principle for ensuring the peaceful coexistence among people. In this regard, the cited cases of Aboriginal circles, and religious arbitration courts, demonstrate the risks potentially deriving from the inclusion of traditional means of adjudication in the legal framework, as they could be detrimental for groups representing a minority inside the minority, such as women or children.
When dealing with the accommodation of cultural traditions with the principle of equality, it should not be ignored, however, the adverse (and unexpected?) impact that the Euro-North American approach produced. Again, the case of Canadian Aboriginals is noteworthy. Before colonization, these communities grounded gender differences on As evident, the issue of gender intersectionality with race and/or religion should be handled with care, for it carries a risk of hierarchizing women, instead of ensuring a fair application of the principle of equality. Indeed, intersectionality must be conceived of as a tool for discussing discrimination with the aim of protecting women and their multifaceted identities, and not as a tool for justifying discrimination on the ground of those cultural elements that contribute to create the identity. II Actually the doctine has evolved even further. La Barbera, for instance, assumed that the Crenshaw approach to intersectionality should be broadened in order to be intended as an attribute of gender, assuming the latter 'inherently made up by different conditions all of which simultaneously shape gender in a nonpredefined way' (La Barbera 2009). III It is worth remembering that lands currently belonging to Canada, whose name derives from the HuronIroquois world Kanata (settlement), were originally sparsely inhabited by Aboriginal tribes then colonized by French and British since mid-XVIII century and unified in a Confederation with the 1867 British North American Act (BNA). Because of the colonisers' ambition of creating a white and Christian country, Canada for long time had a legal framework discriminating Aboriginal peoples. It should be clarified that the noun 'Aboriginal' is used here with reference to First Nations peoples -for long time individuated as IndiansMetis and Inuit; when different treatments were provided for them it is explicitly stated. IV It has to be noted that migration flows to Canada were composed of European people until WWII, whilst later on they were mainly composed of Asian, Caribbean and Latin American people. V In this evolution, a significant role was played by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which in 1969 recommended integration, instead of assimilation, as the main policy to be fulfilled by the federal government. VI It is worthy to note that, differently from Inuit and First Nations, Metis never experienced restrictions in their right to vote. VII The process however needed several years, as emerges from the consideration that the first recognitions of spouses' equality occurred in the 1920s, but Quebec recognized it only in 1964. VIII R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. XXIX It can be relevant to remember that, for instance, the Indian Act and the amendments progressively introduced to it, imposed on Aboriginal children a requirement to attend schools in the non-Aboriginal cities, and forbad traditional ceremonies including dances, in a clear attempt of obliterating Aboriginal traditions among younger generations. XXX The assimilationist attempt was led in a very crude way, which completely ignored Aboriginal traditions. For instance, a campaign for individuating each member of the communities by imposing a single nameagainst the tradition according to which Inuit may have been known by several names throughout their lives and depending on context -was led by providing them with leather discs, originally to be worn on one's person. XXXI 
